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ABSTRACT
Existing literature on IT standards focuses on the role of technical factors such as network effects
and competitive behavior on the creation of standards. However, the role of users and vendors in
initiating the standards definition and ratification process is less well understood. Given the
advantages associated with standards, all users and vendors of IT products would be expected to
be glad to participate in the standards definition and ratification process. However, if that were the
case, many fewer proprietary technologies would compete. This paper explains qualitatively why
users, vendors, and government bodies choose (or don’t choose) to participate in the standards
definition and ratification process. A better understanding of their motivations for participating or
not in the process should help to attract more participants to the process. The paper concludes by
analyzing strategies to recover the cost of standards definition and ratification process, and their
impact on the standards adoption rate.
KEYWORDS: communications standards, standards development, standards evolution, IT
standards.
I. INTRODUCTION
IT standards dictate the consensus rules for designing, producing, testing, and installing IT
products, services, and systems. These standards are important because they:

•

lower the costs associated with developing and deploying IT systems, and

•

make these systems more efficient and compatible.
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Among practitioners, standards development is considered very important. Many large industries
are based on standards. For example, the Ethernet standards (ISO/IEC 1 8802.3 CSMA/CD) built
an industry from nearly zero in 1980 to many billions 2 today. Therefore, business organizations
and government bodies spent considerable time and effort on the standards definition and
ratification process.
The importance of standards is also evident in the amount of academic research on the subject.
For example, early work in the industrial organization literature studied the effect of network
externalities on de facto standardization [e.g., Farrell and Saloner, 1985; Katz and Shapiro, 1985,
1986, 1992]. Specific issues addressed by these studies include-

•

the role of the prior reputation of firms on their compatibility decisions [Katz and
Shapiro, 1985],

•

the impact of incomplete information on adopting incompatible technologies [Farrell
and Saloner, 1986], and

•

the role of technology sponsorship on the emergence of de facto standards [Katz and
Shapiro, 1986].

More relevant to IS researchers, some of these studies focused on the role of technology
sponsorship in creating a strategic advantage when incompatible technologies compete in
markets with network externalities [e.g., Katz and Shapiro, 1986].
Another important finding relevant to IT industry is that the strength of consumer preferences for
software variety drives the equilibrium outcomes for hardware platforms. For example, when
consumers value the variety of available software more than they value the variety in hardware,
the equilibrium outcome is a de facto standardization in the hardware market. In these markets,
the hardware is supported by the majority of software providers, becomes the dominant hardware
platform [Church and Gandal, 1992]. Research in information systems though, is not rich in
addressing standards-related issues. However, IS researchers did focus on factors that impact
the adoption of IT systems based on particular communication standards. For example, a large
body of literature deals with the adoption of EDI systems [e.g., Iacovou et al., 1995; Chau, 2001;
Iskandar et al., 2001; Mukhopadhyay, 1995]. These studies provide guidance to practitioners and
academics in understanding diffusion of standards.
In summary, the industrial organization literature predominantly deals with understanding the
emergence of de facto standards, while the information systems literature focuses on the
diffusion and adoption of these standards. While these issues are important, they do not cover
the broad dynamics of the formal standards definition and ratification process. In particular, little is
understood about the activities that take place during the initial phase of any standards
development. In this phase someone - an individual, an organization, and/or a government body decides to take the first step towards defining and then ratifying a standard. They then attempt to
attract others to participate in the process. Attracting more members to participate in the process
is important because it impacts adoption directly, and thereby, the success of a standard.
Furthermore, the greater the number of participants, the easier it is to recover the costs of
defining, developing, and promoting the standard.

1

International Electrotechnical Commission
A billion in the U.S. is 1000 million but a million million in the U.K. CAIS uses the 1000 million
definition.

2
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II. THE STANDARDS PROCESS
This paper takes a qualitative approach to explaining the motivation of users, vendors, and
government bodies in initiating the standards development and ratification process. It attempts to
address questions such as:

•

Who is more likely to initiate the standards definition and ratification process?

•

What are the underlying motivations of the participants?

•

What are the factors that keep the affected parties from participating?

•

What is the cost of participation in the process?

Before addressing these issues formally, we discuss the formal process by which standards are
defined, proposed, refined, and finally ratified as national and international standards. The
ultimate goal of any IT standard is to become an international standard because international
standards enable a single design to

•

cross country boundaries without technology barriers,

•

build large user pools, and

•

reduce product/application design costs.

At the inception/definition phase of the standards development process, an interested party
decides to initiate the process either on its own or in collaboration with others. It should be noted
at this point that for the remainder of this paper, potential initiators (i.e., those who take the first
step and initiate the standards development process) are classified as vendors, user
organizations (or users), and government/privately funded organizations (e.g., regional and
national SDOs 3 ). Vendors are defined as those organizations which can incorporate the
standards in the products and services that they sell to the user organizations. This paper
assumes that individuals interested in being part of the process do so by being affiliated to one or
more of the aforementioned initiators.
Figure 1 shows the multiple paths to an ISO/IEC JTC1 recognized international standard
[Robinson, 1999]. For example, the standard could be developed in one of the subcommittees of
professional communities (e.g., such as IEEE P802 does in its subcommittee six (SC6)) and then
submitted, via one of the national Standards Development Organizations (SDOs) or directly, to
the international SDO. Another option is that a standard is developed by a business organization
or a group of business organizations (e.g. consortium). This standard is then ratified through the
Publicly Available Standards (PAS) process. This process allows the standards developers to
bypass the regional and national SDOs and submit the proposed specification(s) directly for
inclusion into ISO/IEC standards.

3

SDOs are organizations that develop and maintain the models, data dictionaries, structure,
syntax, and implementation materials for standards.
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Figure 1: Standards Development Process- From Inception to Acceptance
The following section provides a qualitative explanation of the rationale behind the decision to
participate or abstain from the standards definition and ratification process.
II. PARTICIPATE IN THE STANDARDS DEFINITION AND RATIFICATION PROCESS OR
NOT?
Figure 1 shows the various stakeholders involved in the standards definition and ratification
process. However, for many of these entities (e.g. IT vendors, government organizations)
standards definition and ratification is not their primary task. The history of IT standards entities
shows that many stakeholders do not become engaged in the standards definition process, even
though they may adopt the standards at a later stage. For example, TCP/IP standards were
defined by the joint initiative of the US Department of Defense and academic institutions before
they became widely accepted and adopted throughout the world, while HTTP standards for online
document formats and standards for EDI communication were initially defined by the IT vendors
before they evolved into well defined, universally accepted standards. The following subsections
explain the decision of these various stakeholders (i.e. vendors, users, and governments) to
participate in or abstain from the standards definition and ratification process that goes on in their
relevant industries.
USERS AND STANDARDS DEFINITION
Existing literature and anecdotal evidence from industry suggest that users can benefit greatly
from IT standards. In particular, two strong incentives to support initiatives aimed at defining and
ratifying standards are:

•

to commoditize the product, and

•

to minimize the cost of deploying and managing communications systems that link
them with other users.
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Therefore it seems logical to argue that users should be in the forefront of any standards
definition and ratification initiative. This, however, is not always the case. All user organizations
are not actively involved in the standards definition process.
To illustrate this point, consider a simple strategic game. The game involves two users, who can
either decide to initiate the standards definition process. The cost to initiate the process is c.
Alternatively, the users can abstain from the process. The important feature of this game, as a
model of providing a public good, is that if both players choose to participate in the process they
both pay the full cost, i.e. c, as opposed to sharing the cost equally. One interpretation of this
assumption is that the two users belong to a committee or consortium of users. The opportunity
cost of time spent in attending the meeting is c for each participant and the number of other
participants does not affect this cost [Fundenberg and Tirole, 2000]. Once the standards are
defined, both benefit from these standards. This benefit is 1 for each user. The payoffs for the
two users are shown in Figure 2. The pure strategy Nash equilibriums of this game are that one
user initiates the standards development process, while the other abstains from participating in
this process.

Participate
Abstain

Participate

Abstain

(1-c), (1-c)

(1-c), 1

1, (1-c)

0,0

Figure 2: Standards Public/Shared Goods
Thus, in a more general setting, we should expect to find some user organizations getting
together to form a consortium and initiate the standards definition and ratification process, while
the remaining user organizations abstain from the process. However, the abstaining user
organizations may adopt the standards once they are ratified by the national and international
standards development organizations. This simple model explains why some user organizations
would participate while other would abstain from the standards definition and ratification process.
However, it provides no clues about the rationale behind these decisions.
Two reasons why some users may be reluctant to participate in this process are:
1. The users could end up paying a higher price for compatible systems that emerge
due to the presence of standards [Shy, 2001]. These price premiums could far
exceed any benefits that result from the compatibility brought about by standards
[Shy, 2001]. Furthermore, in the absence of relevant standards, the users’ desire for
compatibility intensifies competition among incompatible systems, resulting in
reduced prices [Shy, 2001]. Therefore, some users would prefer to abstain from any
process (i.e. the standards definition and ratification process) that would ultimately
result in standards.
2. Some users (individuals and/or organizations) want to obtain the benefit of the
standards without spending resources on the standards definition and ratification
process. This outcome results from the “free rider” problem often associated with
providing any public goods.
Why do users participate in the standards definition and ratification process?
1. The user firms that already use some proprietary standards want these standards to
be ratified as national and international standards. A good example is the case of
Web Services, where firms such as IBM and Microsoft developed technologies to
meet their own needs. They then realized that they created something that could be
useful in a wider context. This realization prompted them to initiate the standards
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definition and ratification process by submitting their proprietary standards to national
and international standards development organizations for approval. It should be
noted at this point that these users could also act as vendors, in the wider context,
when they benefit by selling products and applications based on these standards.
2. If the user firms are dominant in the industry, they can dictate the communication
standards that are adopted in their industry. For example, in the automobile industry,
the auto manufacturers were instrumental in the adoption of EDI. Another example is
the financial services industry where 29 major firms, including Bank of America, Citi
Bank, Wells Fargo, and MasterCard formed a consortium 4 to develop financial web
services standards. In this same industry, in 1996, Visa and MasterCard jointly
developed a single standard, called Secure Electronic Transactions (SET), to secure
payment card transactions over insecure networks. Other major card brands,
including American Express and NOVUS (Discover), later endorsed the SET
standard.
Even if the reasons why a user organization wants to participate in standards development
process can be explained, how do we explain their acceptance of free riders? One explanation
lies in the very nature of standards. That is, the standard displays consumption or network
externalities, and provides significant economies of scale, i.e. larger the number of organizations
that adopt the standards, greater is the benefit to the adopters. This rationale is also supported by
the economic theory of clubs [Buchanan, 1965]. This theory describes and formalizes the
institutional properties of a new category of goods (or product) lying between the public and
private polar extremes, i.e., conventionally called shared good (e.g. IT standards). Only members
participating in a voluntary association, i.e., a club whose membership may be regulated by some
dues, usually enjoy these goods. However, the traditional club model implies that the value
generated by the shared good decreases as the number of users increase [Buchanan, 1965].
However, in case of network products (e.g. IT standards) “the performance of the product as well
as its utility increases with the increase of the community of users” [Antonelli and Foray, 1992].
Therefore, user organizations that initially get together to initiate the standards definition and
ratification process, accept free riders at a later stage when the standards, which are network
products, are ready for adoption.
The costs associated with standards definition and ratification can be recovered by charging a
licensing fee (if the standards are for sale) from vendors who use these standards in their
products and services. Since the license fee generated is proportional to the number of users
who use products and services based on the standards, it is in the interest of the users to accept
free riders. While the participation of users in the standards definition and ratification process is
hindered by the free rider problem, the participation decision for vendors is also not a
straightforward issue. The following section analyzes the motivation behind a vendor’s decision to
participate in the standards definition and ratification process or abstain from it.
VENDORS AND STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT
Previous debates on standardization emphasized the impact of technological compatibility on
inter-firm competition [Besen and Farrell, 1994; Baseman et al., 1996]. On one hand, consumers
assign higher value to products that give them access to large networks. They therefore are more
willing to pay for compatible goods. On the other hand, compatibility may increase product
substitutability, thereby leading to increased competition. For example, producing software that is
compatible with a dominant hardware yields higher sales. However, doing so will lead to more
competition with other software producers [Church and Gandal, 1992]). Thus, tension between
standardization (i.e. providing compatibility), and unique capability (i.e. achieving a
business/competitive advantage) is inherent. Vendors face a choice between making their

4

The Interactive Financial eXchange Forum
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products compatible with those of their competitors (i.e. competing within a standard), or to make
them incompatible (i.e. competing on standards). Vendors cannot postpone the decision for long
because, in network markets, the coexistence of incompatible products may be unstable, and a
single winning standard finally emerges and dominates the market [Besen and Farrel, 1994].
Competing on Standards
A firm would want to compete on standards for two reasons:
1. It may want to use its technical incompatibility as a strategic tool to gain market
dominance. For example, Microsoft used technical incompatibility, as part of its
competitive strategy to emerge as the dominant player, and then maintain the
dominant position in the market for operating system software [Baseman et al.,
1996].
2. If a firm controls a technology that becomes established as a standard at a later date,
the firm can achieve an extremely profitable market position [Ferguson and Moris,
1993]. Examples include IBM’s historical dominance of the mainframe computer
industry, Microsoft’s dominance of the desktop operating systems market, Intel’s
position in the microprocessor market..
There are, however, two major drawbacks to competition between standards.
1. Vendors who compete fiercely to have their technologies become the standard may
dissipate part (perhaps a large part) of the potential gains. For example, when users’
preferences exhibit network externalities (i.e. users prefer compatibility), and if the
competing products are incompatible and differentiated, then prices and profit levels
decline due to fierce competition between the vendors [Shy, 2001].
2. A competition between standards may delay market growth by encouraging buyers to
wait for the dominant standard to emerge before they make purchase decisions
[Business Week, 1993].
The alternative choice for the vendors is that they compete within a standard, i.e. they
standardize, thus explicitly or implicitly agree to make their products compatible. Agreeing on a
standard may eliminate competition between technologies, but it does not eliminate competition
altogether. Instead, it channels it into other dimensions, such as price, service, and product
features. However, competition in these dimensions may not be bad. For example, industry
profits tend to be higher when firms choose compatibility over incompatibility [Shy, 2001].
Participating in the Standards Process
If vendors decide that it is better to standardize, they face the question of whether or not to
participating in the standards definition process. Vendors who decide not to participate in the
standards definition and ratification process can still make their products comply with the
standards that ultimately emerge at the end of the process. They may, however, be required to
pay a higher fee for using the standards (assuming the standards require payment) and incur a
significant switching cost when producing/using products and services based on the new
standards. In addition, they can be caught unaware when a new standard influenced by
competitors is published. On the positive side, non-participating vendors save on the cost of
participating in the standards definition and ratification process (e.g. membership fees).
Being a part of the process offers benefits. These benefits include:
1. Influence the direction of the process, leading to standards that are more favorable to
(or compatible with) their existing products and services. This compatibility should
provide them with significant commercial and competitive advantage in their
respective markets.
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2. Their products based on these new standards would be backward compatible with
their existing products and services. Their existing customers would find ikt easier to
adopt the products and services based on the new standards.
3. Vendors that participate in the standards definition and ratification process also benefit
from reduced cost of purchasing the standards (i.e. buying the license to use them),
and reduced cost of switching to these new standards.
4. By participating in the standards development process, an organization gets an
opportunity to develop close relationships with other participants such as customers,
competitors and regulatory authorities.
Choosing a Policy
Given the reasons for competing within standards and competing between standards, is it
possible to predict if vendors would choose the latter or the former?
Vendors are more likely to choose incompatibility, i.e. compete between standards when-

•

they are symmetric in their market and technology positions;

•

the standards battle alone does not greatly delay the adoption of the technology by
consumers; and

•

within-standards competition is especially likely to dissipate potential industry profits
[Besen and Farrel, 1994].

If one or more of these conditions are not satisfied, then the firms are more likely to compete
within standards. However, before they do so, they need to converge towards a standard through
a formal process (e.g. form a consortium to define the standards) or through some informal forces
where all the vendors gravitate towards the proprietary standards of one or more of these firms.
One way to study this choice is to model the vendors’ decision problem as a strategic form game
similar to the “battle of sexes”. Consider two vendors each whom would prefer its own
technology as the standard, but each would prefer compatibility with its rival’s technology to going
it alone. This type of strategic behavior is often visible when one vendor has already incorporated
an attribute in its products, and the adoption of other vendor’s product suffers because of the lack
of this attribute. At the same time, both vendors realize that between-standards competition is
likely to dissipate potential industry profits.
If the two proprietary standards are denoted by S1 and S2, the payoffs for this game are shown in
Figure 3. The game’s pure strategy equilibrium occurs when the vendors agree to accept one or
the other proprietary standard as the industry standard.
S1
S1

2,1

S2
0,0

S2

0,0

1,2

Figure 3: Vendor Participation
The pure strategy equilibrium of this game illustrates how the two vendors would agree on one of
the given standards. However, it does not tell us which standard these vendors will agree upon.
In some cases, one vendor will accept the proprietary standard of the other vendor as an industry
standard because that proprietary standard is already well established and the non-compliant
vendor does not want to invest resources in defining, developing, and promoting a new standard
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to compete with this established standard. This outcome is illustrated by the example of Secure
Socket Layer (SSL/TLS) standards. Sensitive online traffic is usually protected by a cryptographic
system originally called Secure Socket Layer (SSL). SSL originally was created by Netscape and
placed in its Navigator browser. Later, all major browser vendors, including Microsoft’s Explore,
supported SSL, making SSL a de facto standard. Later, the standardization effort was passed to
the IETF, which renamed the standards Transport Layer Security (TLS).
Another way by which the vendors agree on a standard is when the vendor who wants its’
standard to be adopted offers some incentive to the other vendors to agree. Incentives can
include low-cost licensing, commitment to join future development, and promising timely
information about upgrades. [Besen and Farrel, 1994].
A possible outcome, not captured by the game in Figure 3 is that both firms agree on a standard
which is a hybrid of their proprietary standard or develop a new standard from scratch. This
outcome is most likely, when

•

the firms are symmetric in their market and technology positions;

•

the standards battle is delaying the adoption of the technology by consumers; and

•

inter-technology competition is especially likely to dissipate potential industry profits.

The case of Remote Access Servers (RAS) illustrates this outcome. Early remote users were
required to dial into sites using a telephone modem and PPP (Point to Point Protocol). 5 They
connected to a remote access server (RAS) at the site. The RAS authenticated them and then
gave them access to other computers at the site. The earlier systems for RAS access control
used proprietary protocols that differed among RAS vendors. To address the lack of RAS
standards and the need to manage multiple RASs, vendors collaborated on a way to implement
policy-based authentication on remote access servers. Their standard was the Remote
Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS).
GOVERNMENT AND STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT
Governments are involved in standards development process through national standards
developing organizations (e.g. ANSI 6 ) and professional bodies (e.g., IEEE 7 ). Government’s are
involved because:

•

They themselves are major user of IT products.
As users governments want to participate in the standards definition and ratification
process like any other user organization. For instance, they use some proprietary
standards, and they want these to be confirmed as national and international
standards. In addition, they may want to leverage their position as a major consumer
of IT products by influencing standards definition favorable to IT products and
services that they already use.

•

They are interested in long-term social welfare.
Governments ensure long-term social welfare by mitigating factors that potentially
lead to the failure of a standards definition and ratification process. They do so, by
providing an environment (e.g., through national Standards Development
Organizations (SDOs)) in which vendors and users can get together to define

5

Protocol encapsulating a connection to a TCP/IP network through a modem and a telephone line.
American National Standards Institute
7
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
6
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standards. The government also claims to take the long-term view (e.g.,
interoperability, scalability, extensibility, accessibility, etc.) about standards
development, instead of satisfying short-term user (e.g. compatibility with their legacy
systems) and vendor (e.g. short-term profitability) goals. Governments try to enlarge
social welfare through

1. preventing situations where standards could be used for monopolistic gains,
2. keeping the standards process as open and flexible and possible,
3. ensuring that the standards themselves are non-proprietary and interoperable.
From an economics perspective, by participating in standards development,
government facilitates the development of interoperable systems. Interoperability, in
turn fosters competition which is key to any market economy.

•

They are interested in safeguarding the competitiveness of their domestic industries
[Jensen and Thursby, 1996].
International R&D competition often results in outcomes where several firms develop
and patent products that are close substitutes, but are based on different standards.
In this situation, it is not uncommon for governments to set anticipatory standards
intended to improve the strategic (competitive) position of their domestic firms. The
following are examples:
1. In the United States, the National Competitiveness Act of 1993 and various
congressional studies (US Congress 1988 and 1992) recommend the use of
standards to support US industry in technology development.
2. Federal Communications Commission regulations required that high
definition TV (HDTV) transmission in the US should either be compatible with
receivers used in USA, or should allow simultaneous broadcast with existing
channels. This regulation was generally considered to be a strategic move to
improve the position of US firms trying to develop HDTV against the
Japanese advantage in the area. It meant that the Japanese MUSE system
could not be used in the United States without adaptation. Similarly, Europe
never adopted a single color TV standard because individual governments
promoted standards to protect the interest of their domestic firms [Hazard
and Daems, 1988; Pelkmans and Beuter, 1987].

III. COST OF PARTICIPATION AND STANDARDS ADOPTION
In Section II, the cost of participating in the standards definition and ratification process emerged
as a key variable that affects the decision. In this section, we discuss how this cost could be
recovered. We address this issue by qualitatively analyzing the popular cost recovery strategies
and how these strategies affect the rate of standards adoption at a later stage.
Participants bear the costs of the standards definition and ratification process. For example, in
addition to the costs involved in communication, coordination and administration of the process
itself, the standards must be printed and distributed. Furthermore, every few years, a standard
must be revised, reaffirmed, or withdrawn to address current technology. Considerable costs are
incurred in promoting the acceptance of standards in the marketplace, such as investment in
education of potential adopters about the merit and integrity of standards.
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One way to recover these costs is through selling standards (e.g. royalties, subscription). For
example, both Microsoft and IBM used so-called “reasonable and non-discriminatory” (Rand)
licensing to cover intellectual property in some of “their” standards. The companies charged
others to use patented parts of these standards. Another example is Apple, which charged for its
technology in the FireWire interface for some years. One drawback with selling the standards is
that it can delay its widespread adoption. The cost of managing the standards definition and
ratification process can also be recovered through membership fees from organizations that
decide to participate in the process. A major drawback of this strategy is that it encourages free
riders. Thus, any cost recovery strategy needs to find the optimal combination of membership
cost and the sales price for the standards in order to minimize free riding and increase the
adoption rate (Table 1).
Table 1. Strategies for Recovering the Cost of Standards Development
Membership Fee
Low

Low
Sales Price
of
Standards
High

High

•
•
•
•

Difficult to recover costs
Attract more participation
Encourage free riding
Encourage fast standards
adoption

•
•
•
•

•
•
•

Easier to recover costs
Attract more participation
Encourage fast standards
adoption among
participants
Discourage free riding

•
•
•
•

•

Easier to recover costs
Attract less participation
Encourage free riding,
Encourage fast standards
adoption
among
nonparticipants
Easiest to recover costs
Attract less participation
Discourage free riding,
Slow standards adoption

Most government bodies involved in standards definition generally operate on the strategy of
minimal membership fee and minimal sales cost. This strategy encourages both free riding and
participation. It also results in faster adoption rates. Governments can afford this strategy by
subsidizing the standards definition and ratification process.
If the process is initiated and undertaken by business organizations, it must be fully funded by
selling the standards and/or membership fee. Table 1 shows that a good strategy for business
organizations is the one in which participating members pay a low membership fee, allowing for a
large participation, while the non-participating members pay a relatively high amount to use the
standards to discourage free riding. Higher participation also results in a faster adoption rate.
The worst strategy for cost recovery is the one in which the membership fee is high and the
standards are sold at a high price. This strategy prevents free riding but also slows down the
adoption of the standards. If a few participants want to influence the standards in their favor, they
are better off by adopting the strategy where they charge a high membership fee and a then sell
the resulting standard at a minimum price (ideally allow it to be used for free). A minimum sale
price encourages free riders but also accelerate the standards’ adoption rate. A high membership
fee reduce the number of members and the fewer remaining members have a stronger influence
on the final definition of standards. Therefore, participants with a lot at stake (e.g. a large
deployed base of existing products based on their proprietary standard) have an incentive to
advocate giving away of the standards for free and recovering the cost of standards development
through a membership fee.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Standards, once set, are difficult to change. They do evolve with technology. The early
participants in the process significantly influence on the standards that we end up with. Therefore,
it is important to understand who these early participants are and their motivation for initiating the
standards definition and ratification process. This understanding will help to improve the process
by –

•

getting more participation from relevant organizations,

•

increasing the rate of adoption for the final standards, and

•

enabling a faster recovery of the costs associated with the process.

A qualitative analysis of the issue shows that users gain the most from standards. However, not
all users participate because they either want a free ride or fear that they may end up paying
extra for the compatibility brought about by these standards. Vendors’ participation depends on
whether they want to compete on standards or within standards. This paper identifies macro-level
conditions under which vendors would prefer to compete between standards and conditions
under which they would prefer to compete within standards. The paper also analyzes strategies
to recover the costs associated with a standards definition and ratification process, and the
impact of costs on the standards adoption rate.
Admittedly, this paper is qualitative and takes a simplified approach to address complex issues.
This approach was intentional so as to be able to analyze the issue of standards development
from a broader perspective and tp help explain the macro environment in which standards
definition and ratification process is initiated. A discussion of this macro-environment in
conjunction with the issues already studied (e.g. factors that affect standards adoption, factors
that influence the emergence of one standard over another), and issues still under investigation
(e.g. adoption of standards across industries and nations, optimal standards development
process, and technical specifications of standards themselves), will provide us with a better
understanding of the evolution of IT standards.
Editor’s Note: This article was received on August 19, 2005 and was published on January __,
2006. The article was with the author for one revision.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS
ANSI- The American National Standards Institute
CSMA/CD- Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Detection
EDI- Electronic Data Interchange
HTTP- Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
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IEC- International Electrotechnical Commission
IEEE- Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IETF- Internet Engineering Task Force
IP- Internet Protocol
ISO- International Standards Organization
IT- Information Technology
JTC1- Joint (ISO and IEC) Technical Committee 1
PAS- Publicly Available Standards
PPP- Point-to-Point Protocol
RADIUS- Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service
RAS- Remote Access Servers
SDO- Standards Development Organizations
SET- Secure Electronic Transactions
SSL- Secure Socket Layer
TCP- Transmission Control Protocol
TLS- Transport Layer Security
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